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Abstract—
We expose a new security leak for smartphone users, which allows to stole user personal data
by accessing the mobile operator user page when auto-login is employed. We show how any
”apparently” genuine app can steal these data from some mobile operators, affecting more than
80% of Italian mobile smartphones.
Smartphones have become the most popular
mobile device, especially thanks to their fast evo-
lution and their capabilities. They have become
an invaluable tool for everyday life and are used
for any kind of activities, from simple video-call,
photos, or email, to social media interaction and
sport tracking activities.
On the other hand, the pervasiveness of smart-
phones, together with a myriad of mobile appli-
cations, has highly increased the related security
and privacy threats for user data [1], [2]. As
smartphones contain a trove of private informa-
tion, users are continuously exposed to privacy
issues. Mobile phones own a plethora of de-
tails about our personal life: locations, messages,
calls. That makes smartphone privacy issues more
important than ever – personal life details are
private and must remain so. To guarantee and
protect user data, over the last few years several
public regulations and entities were born, such as
GDPR [3] in Europe and CCPA [4] in the USA.
These regulations set best practices and rules to
manage, store and protect the collected user data.
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Nevertheless, users are still exposed to several
security issues and privacy leaks, and most of
them are only partially known.
In this paper, we aim to highlight a severe
privacy vulnerability of mobile operators (i.e., the
telecommunication companies) which threatens
to expose users’ data to attacks at the expense
of a faster and frictionless user experience. In
particular, mobile operators (MOs) often provide
a dedicated web page or an application for their
users, to check their billing accounts. With the
advent of different commercial offers, customers
can be charged depending on many factors, and
to keep them aware of their expenses, the mobile
operators must provide access to their accounts.
The vulnerability works as follows: mobile
operators often provide a user-friendly service
to access auto authenticated web pages or mo-
bile apps. When a user is surfing the Internet
through her mobile connection she can automati-
cally access her billing account, and her personal
information, the amount of credit available, the
number of calls done, the amount of gigabytes
consumed, the text messages delivered, and so on.
She can also activate or disable services, without
any explicit authentication.
These services often use the ”Frictionless”
design pattern [5] – in a nutshell, users should be
able to access services with the lowest number
of obstacles possible. One famous example is the
”one-click buying” service developed by Ama-
zon. Once that the user has registered its delivery
address and its payment methods, it has to do
only one click to buy a product. Without asking
for logins or double confirmation, the user can
buy in a fast and obstacle free way.
While this system makes life easier for the
users, it comes with several threats to privacy.
For example, with the Amazon service, as soon
as an order is created an email is sent to the
user performing the action. If an unauthorized
user is using the ”one-click buying” service, the
owner of the account is immediately informed
and can interrupt the operation, since there is a
time between the order creation and the effective
delivery.
Following the same approach, many telecom-
munication companies allow their mobile users
to access some services without any login, as
the company is able to identify from which
Figure 1. Example of data that can be stolen by a
malicious app installed on a user smartphone. The
app is able to access all the user personal details:
name and surname; customer identification code;
personal identification numbers (i.e., Fiscal code or
P.IVA); address data (i.e., street address, city, region
and state); and contact info, such email and alterna-
tive number.
SIM, subscriber identity module, the traffic is
generated. The frictionless service improves the
user experience, but it may also expose private
information. For example, all the applications
installed on the smartphone may access the user
name, address, id code, or phone number. Figure
1 shows a real example of the data that may
be stolen by a mobile application. Moreover, if
the user grants an attacker to use his Internet
connection (e.g., through a hotspot service), the
latter can access his billing account. In general,
without an explicit authentication method, any
application, or browser, can access the user data
on the mobile operator server. Figure 2 and Figure
3 explain the two attacks.
The attack depicted in Figure 2 can be ac-
complished by any application installed on a
smartphone. A number of mobile operators allow
their users to access personal information through
the web browser (step 1 of the figure), without re-
quiring any password. The authentication is done
(step 2) through the identification of the MSISDN
which is generating the traffic. Mobile Operator
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Figure 2. The figure shows how any (malicious)
mobile app can steal the user data from the mobile
operator servers. The method takes advantage of
an ”apparently” genuine mobile application. The app,
through simple HTTP requests, can access user data
and services from the mobile operator servers, it
collects them, and eventually it sends these data to
some malicious server.
services uniquely identify the user and return
the required information (step 3). Similarly, an
app installed on the user smartphone may behave
like the web browser (step 4). Its requests would
be authenticated (step 5) exactly like standard
requests (as in step 2) and the Mobile Operator
Service would return the requested data.
The attacker may also exploit the hotspot
functionality, as depicted in Figure 3. Specifically,
if the attacker is connected to the Internet through
a user mobile hotspot (step 1) and sends any
request on the Internet, then Mobile Operator
services will identify those requests as generated
by the user MSISDN (step 3), and hence as legal
(authentic) requests.
In this paper, we investigate the aforemen-
tioned privacy issues and possible solutions. In
particular, we describe the mobile operator vul-
nerabilities, we test seven different Italian mobile
operators to explore the different possibilities
to access user data; we propose some possible
countermeasures; we discuss some related work
and finally draw conclusions.
Threat Analysis
The key concept behind the threat is that self-
authentication allows identified users to easily
access a number of services without any explicit
login. Mobile operators, in particular, leverage
Figure 3. The figure shows how some user private
data may be stolen by a malicious attacker through
a shared hot-spot connection. This method exploits a
shared internet connection (e.g., through a hot-spot
application) granted by the victim. Through this con-
nection, the attacker can access the mobile operator
home page and, if the page does not require any
authentication (i.e., is self-authenticated), the attacker
can access user data and services.
this mechanism to speed up the access time for
their users. Moreover, users can access infor-
mation on its contract with the mobile operator
without any explicit login. The mechanism hinges
on the fact that mobile operators identify from
which SIM the traffic is generated and, as the SIM
is associated with a unique person, they can easily
identify the owner of the SIM. This information
includes, among others, personal data (e.g., name,
surname, or address) and/or data about its mobile
contract, such as the SIM security code, the active
commercial offers and so on.
Furthermore, users are able to perform dif-
ferent operations or to access several services.
They can activate offers or transfer credit to other
users, without any login. When the smartphone is
effectively protected, for example with a passcode
or with biometric controls, an attacker cannot use
the user’s smartphone to access these auto-logged
pages. However, these pages may be available to
all the applications installed on the user smart-
phone, just at an HTTP request away.
In addition, access to the Internet is nowadays
automatically allowed to any app both on Android
and iOS, without any specific permission[6][7].
This means that any app could be able to access
the mobile operator pages, do the self-login and
extract information on the SIM owner. The same
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app may also be able to perform operations on
those pages, such as activating paid services or
downloading the user voice mail.
While the user in case of paid services can
recognize the unauthorized access, in case of
data extraction (e.g., name, address, call list), she
is agnostic about the fraudulent access. Even if
almost all the mobile applications are distributed
by authorized stores (e.g., Google Play store
for Android), they can still be harmful. These
checks are performed both automatically and by
humans. However, as the attack requires only
HTTP requests, they are not detected as malware
or fraudulent. Potentially, all the applications on
iOS and Android stores may perform this attack,
without the user knowing that. In other words,
depending on the mobile operator, an app on
smartphones may perfectly access data, and ex-
tract user information, without being detected.
Moreover, a similar attack can be performed
by exploiting the WiFi hotspot functionality. In-
deed, when a smartphone acts as a hotspot, the
self-authentication feature is extended to all the
devices that are connected to it. Therefore, even
without installing any malicious app on the smart-
phone someone could execute an attack simply
by connecting to the hotspot. We performed an
analysis of the major mobile operators in Italy,
referring to the publicly accessible number of
customers they have. We discovered that the
most important operators have weak protections
against this attack, leaving more than 80% of
mobile smartphone exposed. On the other hand,
smaller companies implemented strong protec-
tions against this attack. For the companies that
we analyzed we present the protections that we
found, and report if we were able to overcome
them, in addition to which information we were
able to extract and which active operations were
allowed to do.
List of Vulnerabilities
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability are
the three key principles which should be guaran-
teed in any secure program. Even two of these
principles — confidentiality and integrity — can
be violated by exploiting SelfLogAttack. In the
following, we present the attacks we identified,
classifying them into two groups: passive attacks
(i.e. they only extract user’s information without
modifying anything), and active attacks (i.e. (they
actively perform operations by modifying the user
services or credit). We tested seven major Ital-
ian mobile operators against these vulnerabilities.
For each operator we explored the possibility to
perform self-login through a browser connection
or through the operator mobile application. In
the case of self-login capable pages, we tried
to perform programmatic login and to interact
with the operator service. Table 1 summarizes
the information we were able to extract and the
operations that we were able to perform.
Confidentiality - Passive Attacks
Through API interaction, we have been able
to extract the following information:
Personal Data
It is possible to extract a wide number of private
personal data such as name, surname, mobile
number, tax code, birth date, birth place and the
address of residence. From three companies, all
these data are fully available. Mobile Operator 4
hides information regarding birth date and place,
making impossible to generate the tax code.
Mobile Operator 5 hides all these data, apart
from the Mobile International ISDN Number
(MSISDN) which is the user mobile number [8].
However, even sharing only the mobile number
allows attackers to track a user and discover
private information. The MSISDN is composed
of Country Code, Number Planning Area and
Subscriber Number. This allows to discover the
user country and operator. Both Mobile Operators
6 and 7 require the user password to access those
data.
SIM Data
All the mobile operators affected by SelfLogAt-
tack allow unauthorized access to a list of the of-
fers that are active on the user contract. They also
show the amount of call, SMS, navigation traffic
and available credit. With one mobile operator,
MO 1 it is also possible to access the current
PIN and PUK of the user SIM. PUK code is also
available with MO 4 and 5. MO 4 sends an email
to the user as soon as a request to access the PUK
is made.
Historical Data
Mobile Operator 1 and 3 partially reveal, without
authentication, the last called phone numbers and
4
Table 1. Vulnerabilities of analyzed Mobile Operators
Mobile OperatorVulnerabilities MO 1 MO 2 MO 3 MO 4 MO 5 MO 6 and MO 7
Name Y Y Y Y N
Surname Y Y Y Y N
Mobile Number (MSISDN) Y Y Y Y Y
Tax Code N* Y Y N N
Birth Date Y Y Y N N
Birth Place Y Y Y N N
Personal Data
Address of Residence Y Y Y Y N
Active Offers Y Y Y Y Y
Credit Y Y Y Y Y
PIN Y N N N NSIM Data
PUK Y N N Y*** Y
Calls Y** N Y** Y N
SMS Senders Y** N Y** Y N
Passive
Attack
Historical
Data Voice Mail N N N Y N
Services Activate Services Y Y N Y N
Change Password Y N N N NPassword Change PIN N N N N N
Active
Attack
Credit Transfer Credit N Y N N N
Self-Login Always Active N Y Y Y Y
Password Required
* Even if not directly available, the Tax Code can be generated from the other information extracted.
** The last three digits of each number are obfuscated.
*** In case of disclosure an email is sent to the SIM owner.
SMS recipients. MO 4 instead fully shows those
numbers. MO 4 also allows access to the audio
files of the user voicemail.
Integrity - Active Attacks
We explored the possibility to perform a num-
ber of active operations on the user’s account:
Activate Services
MO 3 and 5 allow to activate services, which
requires payment, and to disable some spending
limit, i.e., a form of protection for users from too
high billing that disables the user mobile when
such a limit is reached. With MO 4 we have also
been able to activate a ”User not available” mode,
which automatically rejects all incoming calls.
Password
When self-authentication is disabled users are
required to insert a username, typically the user
phone number, and a password, in order to ac-
cess the Mobile Operator portal containing user
data. MO 1 allows changing the user’s personal
password, that one used to access the MO por-
tal, without requiring any authentication and/or
insertion of the old password.
Managing Credit
MO 2 allows to transfer credit to other cus-
tomers of the same Mobile Operator. All the
other recharge operations are protected with a
password.
Privacy by default
Apart from MO 1, self login functionality cannot
be deactivated by customers. MO 1 however
has this service active by default, breaking the
”Privacy by default” pattern [9].
Attack method
For each Mobile Operator, we give some
details on how we have been able to exploit the
vulnerability.
Mobile Operator 1
Exploring the information web page that is ac-
cessible with self-login it is possible to find
many exposed endpoints, able to receive HTTP
requests. While this company exposes a wide
number of users’ details, it is the only one that
allows customers to disable self-login. However,
against the ”Privacy by default” pattern, self-login
in automatically enabled on new contracts.
Mobile Operator 2
This operator allows to identify a number of
exposed API on the information web page that
is accessible with self-login. From those API,
through unauthorized HTTP POST requests, it is
possible to obtain personal information in differ-
ent formats, like JSON or XML. Requests have
to be executed using TLS, and no controls are
made on sent headers.
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Mobile Operator 3
While this company does not offer any self-
logged access through browsers, its mobile ap-
plication allows access to a wide number of
functionalities without authentication. This infor-
mation is exposed through a series of API that can
be easily extracted from the mobile application.
In this case, it would be possible to collect these
endpoints, decompiling the Android application.
Mobile Operator 4
This company exposes a website where a user,
using its mobile connection, can self-login and
access much information. The landing page is
equipped with a Javascript function which veri-
fies, making a server-side call to an authentication
server, if the user is using a mobile connection
and if the SIM is owned by the operator. If the
HTTP request is successful, the user is authen-
ticated to its personal page; otherwise, she is
redirected to another page with a cookie. Making
a simple HTTP GET request to the page is
not enough to access that page. However, if an
attacker makes an HTTP GET request to the
authentication server, she is able to obtain an
authenticated cookie session. With this cookie set,
the attacker is able to extract the user information
with a series of HTTP GET requests.
Mobile Operator 5
This company exposes a web page, always ac-
cessible only with the mobile connection, which
shows the user mobile number and other informa-
tion regarding the active offers. However, analyz-
ing the company mobile application, it is possible
to find other APIs which are self-authenticated.
Attack Countermeasures
We analyze a number of countermeasures that
allow users to have a safer experience without
privacy issues. For each proposed solution we
analyze its effectiveness — how much it really
protects users — its strength — how complex
it is for an attacker to overcome the protection
— and its impact on the user — how much the
countermeasure implementation impacts the user
experience. For example, a control made with
an SMS Authentication is very effective, as all
the endpoints are unreachable without the code
received in the SMS. However, for an attacker it
could be possible to access the SMS in an easy
way, for example requiring specific permission to
a not careful user, compromising the strength.
Table 2. Contermeasures
Effective Strong Frictionless
Headers Control Low Low High
In-App Certificate Medium Medium Medium
SMS Authentication High Medium Low
Password Authentication High High Low
Captcha Medium High Medium
Headers Control
We propose a server-side check on the headers
sent with the users’ requests. In case a user is
accessing the pages from a browser, she would
send her specific header user-agent unclear. In
the same way, the Internet Service Provider (ISP)
can set specific user-agent on its app requests
still unclear. In this way, the remote server
can automatically drop all the requests coming
from other sources. While this approach limits
the access only to specific sources with specific
headers, not introducing any friction in the user
experience, an attacker can spoof easily the user-
agent header, making its request appear as an
authorized one.
In-App Certificate
It is possible to install specific certificates
on the ISP application, to be installed on users’
smartphones. The mobile app can sign its re-
quests with those certificates, making the remote
server able to identify the request’s source. This
approach, like the Header Control, does not intro-
duce frictions in the users’ experience. However,
it is not applicable to browser accesses and, even
if harder than spoofing a header, an attacker may
be able to extract the certificate and conduct an
attack. Another approach in this case would be to
expose only limited information (like traffic avail-
able, and not the user name) without a specific
login. If the remote service exposes only limited
information the attack effort may not be justified.
SMS Authentication
When a user wants to access its information,
it is possible to ask him to insert its mobile
number. The remote system will then check if
the mobile number corresponds to the SIM and
send a verification code. If the user is able to
provide the code, the connection is authenticated
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and the user can access the service. This approach
provides a strong defense, as an attacker must
already know the user’s mobile number and the
verification code received. While this information
is available on the smartphone, apps require spe-
cific authorization to the user to access it. If the
user provides those authorizations, the attacker
app is able to perform even worse attacks. This
approach introduces a friction for the user, as it
has to perform multiple steps adjunctive.
Password Authentication
As in the case of SMS authentication, when
the user wants to access her ISP pages, she has
to provide some authentication data, which in this
case are her username and password. Differently
from the SMS based authentication, in this case
only the user should know its password, and an
attacker is not able to access this information.
However the user, in addition to the SMS based
authentication steps, has to remember its pass-
word.
Captcha
A captcha is a software check which verifies
that an action is performed by a real user and
not an automatic system. Protecting every ac-
cess with a captcha makes the access impossible
without the interaction with a human. This ap-
proach requires a minimum effort for the user, as
most recent captcha systems usually require only
one click, and protects endpoints from automatic
access. On the other hand, a human attacker
connected to a smartphone acting as a hotspot
is definitely able to overcome such protection
directly solving the captcha. However, in this
case, or the attacker has already been able to
break the WiFi Hotspot protections, like WPA2,
or he must be able to obtain the WiFi access key
from the smartphone owner.
Related work
The problem of protecting mobile users’ pri-
vacy is not new. Already in 1999, Jahan et al.
addressed security and privacy awareness with
a survey for smartphone users [10]. Nowadays,
with the spread of smartphones, users are moni-
tored more and more, and the need for advanced
protection has become evident.
Technically, the mobile operating system pro-
ducers (e.g., Google with Android and Apple
with iOS) introduced an increasing number of
permissions for applications (apps). The users
have to explicitly authorize the apps to access
particular services or data. For example, to access
the user’s position, applications need to ask for
multiple permissions.
In some more restrictive cases, like with iOS,
applications are allowed to use these permissions
only when the app is foreground. However, An-
droid and iOS are still prey of apps that steal
users’ information. Careless developers often im-
port inside their app third parties libraries without
checking their behaviors. Yongzhong et al. in
[11] performed an analysis on more than 150
popular Apps with external libraries, collecting
1909 privacy issues. In some of the issues apps
illegitimately connect to remote server and upload
data. And even when the privacy of users is
not threatened by flaws in implementation, users’
wrong actions may lead to undesired privacy
leaks.
Users are often not even aware of how their
data may be stolen: Balebako et al. [12] con-
ducted a test on real participants trying to evaluate
the gap between the users’ understanding and
their real privacy protection. This study reveals
how users are not able to clearly understand how
to defend themselves. Even most expert users
cannot defend themselves in case of privacy flaw
in application development.
For this reason, Artz et al. [13] developed
Flowdroid, a tool for taint analysis for android
applications able to detect flows which may lead
also to privacy leakage inside apps. However, in
this case, ”features” may become privacy flaws,
like the capability of developers of retain users
logs and analytics. Indeed, in [14] Liu X. et al.
demonstrated how public available and widely
used analytics libraries for android applications
collect private user data.
Differently from the attack presented in our
work, collected data is mainly limited to casual
events and related to text or positions. In the case
presented in our work, exploiting SelfLogAttack
an attacker may collect much more private infor-
mation belonging to the user.
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Conclusions
In the last years, attention to users’ privacy is
reaching a never seen importance. New patterns,
like ”Design by Default” or ”Privacy by Design”,
raise the attention to security and privacy to
the first position while developing new services.
However, users’ private data are still far from
being protected.
In this work, we present a vulnerability based
on ”self-login” which allows collection of per-
sonal data from mobile operators. We also show
that this vulnerability allows performing active
operations, like blocking user’s connectivity or
stealing credit. We present how several compa-
nies are affected by this problem. Although the
companies we could test are mainly located in
Italy, we want to raise the attention on how
the user experience simplification may lead to
vulnerabilities.
In this specific case, it would be enough to
introduce a captcha in order to limit program-
matic access, to limit the information on self-
authenticated pages to the active offers (avoiding
private data) and to allow the self-login deac-
tivation (that should be disabled by default in
order to follow the ”Privacy by default” pattern.
Furthermore, we want to highlight how the hot-
spot service may be risk-prone if enabled without
care. We also present a set of countermeasures
that can protect users’ privacy.
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